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Abstract Can learners accurately judge the rate of their
learning? Rates of learning may be informative when study
time is allocated across materials, and students' judgments
of their learning rate have been proposed as a possible
metacognitive tool. Participants estimated how much they
improved between presentations in multitrial learning
situations in which n-gram paragraphs (in Experiments 1
and 2) or word pairs (Experiments 3 and 4) were learned .
In the first experiment, participants rated improvement on a
percentage scale, whereas on the second and third, judg-
ments were given on a 0–6 scale. Experiment 4 used both a
percentage scale and an absolute number scale. The main
result was that judgments of improvement were poorly
correlated with actual improvement and, in one case, were
negatively correlated. Although judgments of improvement
were correlated with changes in judgments of learning, they
were not reliable indicators of actual improvement. Impli-
cations are discussed for theoretical work on metacognition.
Keywords Metacognition.Metamemory
Successful learning depends not only on the ability to learn,
but also on the ability to monitor learning. Such metacog-
nitive judgments are important for the allocation of study
time, which, in turn, impacts performance (Kornell &
Metcalfe, 2006; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005; Thiede,
Anderson, & Therriault, 2003; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999).
If learners cannot accurately monitor what they have
learned, decisions about what material needs to be studied,
and for how long, will not be optimal, resulting in lower
test performance. Improving metacognitive accuracy is also
associated with better test performance. Thiede et al. (2003)
showed that improved metacomprehension (comprehension
judgments for text material) enhanced students' abilities to
effectively focus their efforts when given time to restudy
items. They more often chose to restudy texts that were less
well learned, leading to superior test performance, as
compared with students who did not generate key words.
These results suggest that metacognitive accuracy guides
learning and affects student performance.
Research on the relation between metacognitive accuracy
and performance has focused on two related kinds of
judgments. One is a judgment of learning (JOL; Kornell &
Metcalfe,2006; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008), which assesses how
much information a person feels is known, usually solicited
on a percentage scale (such as the judgment that 80% of the
items have been learned). The second is a metacomprehen-
sion judgment (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007), which is a
judgment of how well a piece of text is understood, also
generally scaled in terms of performance on a test
concerning the material. Still, there may be other metacog-
nitive judgments besides JOLs and metacomprehension
judgments that are important for study time allocation
and subsequent performance—specifically, judgments
concerning learning rate (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003, 2005),
or in other words, a judgment of improvement (JOI). JOIs
would benefit study because learners could choose to quit
studying an item when the rate of learning drops, with little
to no progress. JOIs would be especially useful when there is
limited time, because no time would be wasted on
unlearnable items. Efforts could be focused on more quickly
learned material in order to maximize overall performance.
Rather than directlyevaluating JOIs, researchers have used
repeated JOLs to represent the subjective learning curve
(Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma'ayan, 2002; Metcalfe & Kornell,
2005). Metcalfe and Kornell (2005)i n f e r r e dp a r t i c i p a n t s '
judged rates of improvement by subtracting the stopping
JOLs from the starting JOLs; yet this JOL difference score,
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may not reflect the subjective sense of improvement. To
infer that these JOL difference scores represent the subjec-
tive sense of improvement may be inaccurate, because it
presumes that people remember their previous JOL states. It
is not certain that all previous JOL states (or even just the
one preceding the JOL) would be remembered—especially
in a complex learning scenario—so it is important to
measure JOIs directly. If the previous assumptions are
correct (Koriat et al., 2002; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005), JOIs
should simply reflect JOL difference scores. JOIs may
indeed be based, in part, on JOLs, but they may also be
influenced by subjective cues, such as a sense of fluency,
interest, frustration, and so on (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005).
Metcalfe and Kornell (2005) explained how a JOL rate
would be a useful judgment during study time. In the
region-of-proximal-learning model, learners use a judgment
of rate of learning as a stopping rule while studying.
According to this model, learners first choose items in the
order of how easy they are to learn. They should stop
studying a particular item when the judged learning rate
drops to an unacceptably low value and should move on to
the next item, to maximize the rate of return per unit time
spent studying. Similarly, Son and Sethi’s( 2006) model of
optimal learning describes how, in most learning scenarios,
focusing on the item with the highest current rate of
improvement will result in the maximum amount of
learning per unit time spent studying.
These analysescontrastwithanearlier model ofstudy time
allocation, discrepancy reduction (Carver & Scheier, 1990;
Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999), in
which learners choose the most difficult (low-JOL) items for
restudy. Some evidence had suggested that people choose to
study the most difficult items, which have the largest
discrepancies between the current state of learning and the
goal, and spend more time on them. This model is referred to
as discrepancy reduction because it is assumed that people
work to reduce discrepancies between the current state and
the goal state (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Recently, however,
conditions have been found in which people did not choose
to study the most difficult items and, instead, started with
easier (yet unlearned) items (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2004;
Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003). These
findings lend some support to the proximal learning model,
but it still remains to be seen whether or not JOIs are
important for stopping decisions.
JOLs and study behavior
Students can explicitly produce and use JOLs when
studying, in order to appropriately decide what to work
on and for how long (Kornell & Bjork, 2007; Kornell &
Metcalfe, 2006; Nelson, Dunlosky, Graf, & Narens, 1994).
In a situation in which learners select items for restudy,
better performance results when learners' choices are
honored, as opposed to dishonored (Kornell & Metcalfe,
2006), showing that people generally choose items that
could benefit from restudy. Metcalfe and Finn (2008) also
demonstrated that JOLs have a direct relationship with
which material is selected for restudy; manipulations that
influence JOLs also influence study choices.
Much research has been conducted concerning the
accuracy of these judgments, with the general finding that
they are somewhat accurate. Nelson and Dunlosky (1991)
found a gamma correlation of .93 between JOLs and actual
recall when JOLs were delayed for a short period of time
after study. Immediate JOLs also show above-chance
accuracy, although the correlations are quite significantly
lower than those for delayed JOLs. People generally show
biases in such judgments (Finn & Metcalfe, 2008; Koriat,
Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002; Meeter & Nelson, 2003). These
biases are best illustrated in multitrial experiments, which
exhibit the underconfidence-with-practice effect (Koriat,
1997; Koriat et al., 2002; Meeter & Nelson, 2003). On the
first trial, people generally show a bias toward overconfi-
dence, giving JOLs that are higher than performance, but
on succeeding trials, they give JOLs that are lower than
actual performance (Koriat et al., 2002). This effect may
translate into inaccurate JOIs; if JOIs are related to JOLs,
these biases will impair the ability to accurately judge
improvement, and improvement could be increasingly
underestimated as well.
Overview of experiments
The present experiments were designed to assess the
accuracy of JOIs. The most optimistic prediction would
be, consistent with the region-of-proximal-learning model,
that learners are sensitive to rate of improvement and can
make accurate statements about rate of improvement. On
the other hand, if improvement is inferred indirectly, from
changes in JOLs, JOIs should be affected by the trend of
increasing underconfidence, so that improvement is in-
creasingly underestimated over time. Finally, if other
variables, such as fluency, interest, or other subjective cues,
are used to inform JOIs, a very different pattern may arise,
including an increasing sense of JOI confidence with
practice. In the extreme, if JOIs are responses to other
cues, rather than true improvement, there may be a zero or
even negative correlation between JOIs and improvement.
In Experiments 1 and 2, we examined learning of
paragraphs of words in the form of n-grams (Shannon,
1948). In Experiments 3 and 4, we used the somewhat more
conventional paired-associate learning paradigm. In the first
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study trial were used, whereas in Experiment 4, judgments
preceding study were also examined. We assumed that for
JOIs to be useful, they would be needed during study, so
we solicited JOIs either just before or just after study and
test, rather than sandwiched within periods of delay. The
JOIs in these experiments were, as such, judgments of
current memory improvements (which may not persist after
a delay). A second assumption was that a JOI would
typically be an aggregate, general judgment of how much
material one is learning in a given amount of time. In each
experiment, participants were asked to make explicit judg-
ments. In Experiment 1, they were asked to make JOIs on
the same scale as JOLs. In Experiments 2 and 3, to
minimize the possibility that the participants were not
judging improvement from a subjective feeling of improve-
ment but were simply subtracting the second most recent
JOL from the most recent JOL, we solicited JOIs on a
different rating scale. Experiment 4 had JOLs and JOIs
made between participants (to entirely avoid participants’
being compelled to base JOIs on JOLs) and investigated the
use of percentage and absolute number scales.
Experiment 1
This experiment was designed to investigate the accuracy
of JOIs for simple text materials, using multiple study–test
trials. The experiment consisted of six repeated trials, in
order to approximate a natural study situation. Difficulty
was manipulated by presenting 50-word paragraphs of
random words that differed in n-gram size. An n-gram is
defined as a sequence of n words from a body of text
(Shannon, 1948); for example, the words in italici would be
a 4-gram: The dog barked at the cat (see Appendix A for
materials). We used these materials with the intention of
approximating a common learning scenario in which
students attempt to learn material contained in a text. We
chose n-grams, rather than actual prose passages, however,
because they are simple text, yet do not require interpreta-
tion or overall comprehension to learn, and it is reasonable
to score them in terms of number of individual words
remembered.
Method
Participants Forty-six students from the participant pool at
the University of California, Merced, volunteered to
participate for class credit.
Materials Three passages were constructed using n-grams
from the “Phrases in English” database from the British
national corpus (Fletcher, http://pie.usna.edu/index.html).
Passages were constructed of randomly chosen 4-grams,
6-grams, or 8-grams, and all the passages were 50 words
long. Any British spellings were changed to American
spellings. Differences in n-gram size were expected to
result in differing levels of learning: 4-gram paragraphs
were expected to be the most difficult to learn because they
were the most random, and 8 grams were expected to be the
easiest because they were the most coherent. However, this
was a secondary prediction, since the intent was mainly to
have a variety of texts.
Procedure The experiment was conducted using a comput-
er program, which randomly selected the order in which the
paragraph types were seen. Each paragraph was presented
for six trials, and each participant saw all three paragraphs.
For each trial, participants viewed the paragraph for 60 s,
made JOLs and JOIs for the paragraph, and were asked to
recall the paragraph. JOLs were prompted with the
question, “What percent of the paragraph (0–100) do you
think you will be able to recall?” JOIs (on trials 2–6 only)
were prompted with the question, “Compared to the
previous trial, what percent more of the paragraph will
you be able to recall?” Actual knowledge of the paragraph
was prompted with asking, “Please type in as much as you
can recall.” Participants then typed in as much of the
material as they could.
Scoring Responses were scored according to how many
words recalled matched words from the paragraph. No
points were taken off for misspellings or being out of order,
since we were concerned strictly with recall of the words.
(The instructions did not inform participants about the exact
details of scoring.) For analysis, judgments were converted
from percentages to number of words; for example, 10%
was converted to 10% of 50, or 5 words. Improvement
values were defined as the increase in recall from one trial
to the next.
Results
Most important, JOIs were compared with actual
improvement in recall, to investigate the relative
accuracy of the judgments. JOIs were also compared
with changes in JOLs across trials, to investigate
whether JOIs could be based on differences in JOLs.
The correlations between JOLs and recall were calcu-
lated, as well as biases in JOLs across trials, to check
for the underconfidence-with-practice effect. All the
correlations were calculated within participants. Some
analyses excluded a few participants because correla-
tions could not be calculated, due to the same response
having been given for each judgment or to missing data.
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was accuracy of JOIs. There were 15 observations per
participant (improvement scores on trials 2–6 for each
paragraph), and we assessed the correlation between judged
improvement and actual improvement in recall over these
15 points (see Table 1 for JOI correlations for all three
experiments). This correlation was significant but small;
mean ρ was .19 (min = −.66, max = .67, SD = .27), t(45) =
4.64, p < .01. JOIs were also compared with JOL difference
scores (difference scores are the difference in JOL values
from one trial to the next, such as trial 2 JOL minus trial 1
JOL) in order to assess the possibility that participants used
differences in JOLs across trials to make JOIs. The mean ρ
for JOI and change in JOL was .31, significantly different
from zero, t(45) = 6.05, p < .01. This was also significantly
greater than the JOI–improvement correlation, t(45) = 2.34,
p < .05. Hence, participants may have been relying on
changes in reported JOLs, rather than on other cues more
related to actual improvement. However, changes in JOLs
are not indicative of actual improvement; the correlation
between JOL difference scores and true improvement was
only .11 (min = −.58, max = .62, SD = .25), t(45) = 3.00,
p < .01.
It is possible that using the same percentage rating scale
for JOLs and JOIs encouraged participants to answer
consistently (e.g., always giving a JOI of 10%, and raising
the JOLs 10%). Through this mechanism, the correlation
between JOIs and JOL difference scores could arise. This is
illustrated in Fig. 1; improvement ratings and changes in
JOLs are flat across trials, especially for trials 3–6. This
suggests that the low correlation between JOIs and actual
improvement could be due to participants’ answering in a
consistent manner between JOIs and JOLs.
Absolute accuracy Bias (average difference score) and
absolute accuracy (mean of squared deviations) (Schraw,
2009) were calculated for JOIs. JOI bias showed overcon-
fidence, relative to actual improvements in recall, with
mean bias = 3.44 (min = −4.56, max = 23.57,S D=6.70).
Mean absolute accuracy was 109.99 (min = 4.37, max =
804.8,S D=194.38). A comparison with JOL change
values showed very similar values, on average: a mean bias
of 4.63 (min = −1.93, max = 25.03, SD = 6.47), and a mean
absolute accuracy value of 128.01 (min = 1.35, max =
895.12, SD = 201.07). However, paired samples t tests
showed that the biases were significantly different (t(45) =
5.16, p < .01) but that the absolute accuracy values were
not significantly different, t(45) = −1.19, p = .242. A
comparison with JOLs showed a mean bias of −12.86
(min = −33, max = 0.37, SD = 8.78), and an absolute
accuracy value of 333.45 (min = 0, max = 1,267.87, SD =
341.30). These numbers were significantly different from
the bias, t(45) = −12.96, p < .01, and accuracy, t(45) = 3.61,
p < .01, statistics between JOIs and improvement.
Judgments of learning We compared JOLs with actual
recall for each of the paragraph types for each participant to
see whether judgment accuracy depended on the difficulty
of the material. Mean JOL correlations were all significant-
ly different from zero (see Table 2). No significant differ-
ences were found among the JOL correlations for the
different paragraphs, so further analyses were collapsed
across paragraph type (mean correlations for individual
paragraphs are listed in Table 2). Correlations were
calculated using data from all six trials for each of three
paragraphs, leading to 18 data points in total for each
participant. The mean JOL Spearman correlation was
ρ = .65, (min = −.29, max = .98, SD = .30), significantly
different from zero, t(45) = 14.78, p < .01. Correlations
were also calculated using Goodman–Kruskal gamma and
Pearson’s r for all four experiments; since they reached the
same conclusions, only Spearman values are listed in the
text (refer to Table 2 for gamma values).
Table 1 Correlations between judgments of improvement (JOIs),
improvement, and judgment of learning (JOL) increase
Experiment Improvement JOL increase
1 JOI .19* .31*
Improvement .11*
2 JOI .04 .34*
Improvement .18*
3 JOI −.37* .36*
Improvement .07
Note. Spearman correlations between JOIs and actual improvement,
JOIs and increases in JOLs, and actual improvement and increases in
JOLs are listed for Experiments 1–3. Values are not listed for
Experiment 4, because JOIs and JOLs were made between subjects
Fig. 1 Average judgments of improvement (JOIs), improvement
values, and changes in judgment of learning (JOL) per trial
(Experiment 1)
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absolute accuracy of judgments, in terms of whether
learning is over- or underestimated. Confidence bias was
calculated by subtracting recall from JOL (see Fig. 2 for
recall vs. JOL values). There was evidence for the
underconfidence-with-practice effect, with bias scores
becoming increasingly negative over time, F(5, 685) =
17.42, MSE = 48.04, p<.001, η
2 = .113.
Discussion
The key finding was a low correlation between JOIs and
actual improvement, suggesting a relatively poor ability to
make JOIs that would be useful for guiding learning.
Although the results do not rule out that possibility that
people are (weakly) sensitive to a subjective sense of
improvement and make judgments on this basis, a possible
alternate explanation is that people simply remember their
previous JOL and report the difference between the two
most recent judgments. Indeed, JOIs were more strongly
correlated with the difference in JOLs than with true
improvement; however, absolute accuracy measures
showed that there were substantial differences between
JOI values and JOL difference scores.
There are other possible explanations for the near-zero
correlation between JOIs and improvement. For example, it
is also possible that participants misunderstood the ques-
tion, or that it was difficult for them to give percentage
ratings for improvement. The finding that JOIs are
somewhat related to JOL difference scores suggests three
possible scenarios: People may use their JOLs to infer
improvement, the percentage scale may encourage a
consistent relationship between JOLs and JOIs (e.g.,
answering 60, 70, 80, or 90 for JOLs and always 10 for
JOI), or subjective cues, such as fluency, may underlie both
JOIs and JOLs, leading to a correlation without an actual
relationship. This may be more likely, since absolute
accuracy measures show the relation between JOIs and
JOL differences to be no better than the relation between
JOIs and actual improvement values.
Experiment 2
This experiment was conducted to examine whether the
same findings would appear when the percentage rating
scale for improvement was not used. In Experiment 2, a 0
to 6 rating scale was used for JOIs. The value of 0 meant no
improvement occurred, whereas a value of 6 meant a lot of
improvement. The 0 to 6 rating scale should discourage
participants from attempting to calculate JOIs from differ-
ences in JOLs, as they may have done in Experiment 1.
Whereas, in Experiment 1, it was possible for participants
to always give a JOI of, say, 10, and always give JOLs an
increment of10% higher, that would be more difficult when
the two scales are different. If people are truly sensitive to
improvement, without mediating JOIs by remembering
previous JOLs, JOIs and actual improvement should still
be correlated. Other than the changed rating scale, the
method for Experiment 2 was similar to that in Experiment 1.
Method
Fifty-six students participated. Three new n-gram passages
were constructed, again as 4-, 6-, and 8-grams. New
passages were created in case there had been idiosyncratic
effects of the specific passages used in Experiment 1.
The experiment was conducted as in Experiment 1,
except that judgments of improvement were prompted with
the question, “On a scale of 0 to 6, with 0 being not at all,
Table 2 Goodman–Kruskal gamma correlations
Experiment
1 Overall 4 gram 6 gram 8 gram
JOL .59* .70* .69* .75*
JOI .19* .20* .21* .11
2 Overall 4 gram 6 gram 8 gram
JOL .57* .68* .71* .61*
JOI .04 −.09 −.05 .12
3 Overall Related Unrelated
JOL .57* .80* .75*
JOI −.40* −.17 −.64*
4 Overall Percent Number
JOL .52* .64* .43*
JOIpre .078 .13 .024
JOIpost .056 .10 .006
Note. Values listed in this table are the gamma correlations for
judgments of learning (JOLs) and judgments of improvement (JOIs),
both overall and for individual conditions in Experiments 1–4
Fig. 2 Mean judgment of learning (JOL) values and recall, per trial
(Experiment 1)
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relative to the last trial?” Again, responses were scored
according to how many words recalled matched words
present in the paragraph. JOIs were converted to Z score
values for each participant, to minimize noninformative
individual differences in what was an arbitrary rating scale.
Results
As in Experiment 1, we assessed accuracy of JOIs. JOIs
were also compared with JOL differences, to investigate
whether JOIs were based on changes in JOLs. Spearman
correlations were calculated for JOLs, as well as biases in
JOLs.
Judgments of improvement JOIs were very poor. The
average correlation between JOI and actual improvement
was ρ = .04 (min = −.67, max = .86, SD = .34), which was
not significantly different from zero, t(57) = 0.97, p = .34.
The correlation between JOIs and the increase in JOLs was
ρ = .32 (min = −.27, max = .84, SD = .31), t(57) = 7.82, p <
.01. As in Experiment 1, changes in JOLs were only a weak
predictor of actual improvement, ρ = .21, (min = −.46,
max = .83, SD = 31), significantly different from zero,
t(57) = 5.11, p < .01. Similar to Experiment 1, the
correlation between JOIs and changes in JOLs was
significantly greater than the correlation between JOIs and
actual improvement, t(57) = 6.15, p < .001.
Average JOIs were also found to increase with each trial,
which is interesting because actual improvement decreased
over time. JOIs were found to be moderately correlated
with JOLs: The average ρ = .51, (min = −.37, max = .98,
SD = .34), t(57) = 11.39, p < .01, and this relationship was
stronger than the relationship between JOIs and increases in
JOL, t(57) = 3.30, p < .01. Fig. 3 illustrates the relationship
between JOIs and actual improvement:Judgments increased
over trials, whereas improvement decreased over trials. Just
as in Experiment 1, JOL difference scores seem flat across
trials (Figs. 1, 3). A stark contrast between the two figures
is the relationship between JOI and improvement; whereas
in Fig. 2 the two lines seem somewhat parallel, in Fig. 3
they appear to go in opposite directions, with JOIs
increasing while actual gains diminish.
Judgments of learning JOLs were compared with actual
recall for each paragraph, but the average correlations were
not significantly different, so the analyses were collapsed
across paragraph type. The mean JOL Spearman correla-
tion, across 18 observations per participant, was .63
(min = −.22, max = .96,S D=.29), significantly different
from zero, t(57) = 16.70, p<. 01.
Confidence bias Averagebiasexhibitedtheunderconfidence-
with-practice effect, replicating the results of Experiment 1,
with mean bias becoming increasingly negative across trials.
This relationship betweenJOLs and recall performancecan be
seen in Fig. 4. A repeated measures ANOVA showed a
significant effect of trial on average bias, F(5, 865) = 30.64,
MSE =4 5 . 1 3 ,p <. 0 0 1 ,η
2 =. 1 5 .
Discussion
This experiment did not yield evidence that students are
sensitive to actual rates of improvement; the mean
correlation was close to zero. Putting together the results
from Experiments 1 and 2, people’s ability to judge their
own rate of improvement in learning seems very poor. The
lack of a significant correlation in Experiment 2 gives
support to the hypothesis that the small correlation found in
Experiment 1 was an effect of the percentage rating scale
for both improvement and learning. The percentage scale
used in Experiment 1 enabled participants to respond
consistently, whereas the 1 to 6 scale used in Experiment
2 did not present this easy opportunity.
Fig. 3 Mean judgments of improvement (JOIs), improvement values,
and changes in judgment of learning (JOL) per trial (Experiment 2)
Fig. 4 Mean judgment of learning (JOL) values and recall per trial
(Experiment 2)
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JOIs and JOLs, as if people used the difference between the
two most recent JOLs to formulate a JOI. This explanation
does not suffice, however, because JOIs increased over trials
an dwe remo rehi gh lyco rr el at edwi thJO Lsth anwi thchanges
in JOLs. An alternate explanation of this effect is that JOIs
may be influenced by other cues that are more salient over
time, such as feelings of familiarity or fluency.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was conducted to assess JOIs for learning of
somewhat more conventional stimuli: word pairs. Word
pairs were chosen on the assumption that they might
provide a wider range of improvement values and because
other research has shown that the relatedness of word
pairs influences JOLs (Dunlosky & Matvey, 2001;
Matvey, Dunlosky, & Schwartz, 2006), with more related
pairs having larger JOL values. We expected that more
related pairs might also have higher JOIs if memory
performance or fluency is a misleading, yet influential,
cue for JOIs. There would also be increasing JOI values
over time if this were the case. If the JOIs are influenced by
changes in JOLs (as opposed to memory performance), JOI
values should not increase over time, and there should be
no differences between JOI values for related versus
unrelated pairs (unless there are also substantial differences
in the learning curves).
Method
Participants Forty-one students participated.
Materials Fifty related word pairs and 50 unrelated word
pairs (nouns) were constructed from the Birkbeck word
association norms (Moss & Older, 1996). Related pairs were
defined as words with a high association (M =3 4 . 9 % ,m i n=
19.6, max = 63.0), and unrelated pairs were defined as words
with low association (M = 2.2%, min = 1.1, max = 2.4).
Procedure Each participant studiedeitherunrelated orrelated
pairs. The experiment was conducted using a computer
program that presented the word pairs in random order. There
were six trials in total. For each trial, participants viewed each
word pairfor 1 s.After all 50 pairs had been seen, participants
were prompted to make made JOLs and JOIs. JOLs were
prompted with the following: “You just studied many word
pairs. Next, you will be presented with the first word of each
pair,andwillbeaskedtorecallthesecondword.Whatpercent
do you think you can recall correctly?” JOIs were prompted
with the following statement: “Compared to the last time you
studied the list, how much do you feel that you improved?
Please answer on a scale of 0 to 6, with 0 meaning 'I didn't
improve at all', and 6 meaning 'I improved very much'.”
Actual knowledge of the words was tested by showing the
first word of each pair, and the participant typed in the
second word in response.
Scoring Responses were scored according to how many
correct target words were recalled. No points were taken off
for misspellings. JOLs were converted from percentage to
number of words. JOIs were standardized to Z score values
for each participant.
Results
Judgments of improvement Most important, JOIs were
compared with actual recall improvements in order to
examine their accuracy. We found that JOIs were not just
lacking in accuracy but that they were completely inaccu-
rate, to the degree that they were negatively correlated with
improvement. When people were improving the most (in
the first few presentations), they gave their lowest JOI
ratings, and when they improved the least (in the last few
presentations), they gave their highest JOI ratings (Fig. 5).
The average JOI ρ was −.37 (min = −1.0, max = 1.0,
SD = .65), which was significantly different from zero,
t(40) = −3.61, p < .01. As in the first two experiments, we
also compared JOIs with changes in JOL values. The
correlation between JOIs and the increase in JOLs was
again significant, with an average ρ = .36 (min = −.5,
max = 1.0, SD = .41), t(40) = 5.56, p < .01. However, JOL
changes were found to be poor indicators of improvement,
just as in Experiments 1 and 2, with an average correlation
of .07 (min = −1, max = .97, SD = .59), t(40) = 0.79,
p = .43. Average JOIs increased with each trial, so they
Fig. 5 Mean judgments of improvement (JOIs), improvement values,
and changes in judgment of learning (JOL) per trial (Experiment 3)
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−1.0, max = 1, SD = .60), t(40) = 4.48, p < .01. The
correlation between JOIs and increase in JOLs was not
significantly different from the correlation between JOIs and
JOLs, t(38) = 0.27, p = .79. Examining Fig. 5 reveals that
JOIs no longer show a steadily increasing trend over time;
average JOIs are highest on trial 5 and decrease on trial 6.
This may be a result of high levels of recall on both trials 5
and 6; some participants may have been aware of this and, as
such, may have given very low JOIs on the last study trial.
Average JOI–true-improvement correlations were com-
pared for the two conditions, to see whether the relatedness
of the words affected JOI accuracy. There was a significant
difference, with the unrelated word pairs having a much
larger, negative correlation than the related condition. The
related condition mean ρ was −.15, whereas the unrelated
pair mean ρ was −.58, t(39) = 2.19, p < .05. Participants
gave the highest JOIs on later trials, whereas this
relationship was much less severe for related words.
Judgments of learning Relative accuracy of JOLs was
measured by comparing JOLs with recall performance and
assessing whether or not the JOLs were affected by the
relatedness of the word pairs. Significant correlations were
found for both conditions, and the two conditions were not
significantly different, t(39) = 0.143, p = .89. Correlations
were calculated for each participant, using data from all six
trials. The overall mean JOL correlation (across conditions)
was .74, which was significantly different from zero,
t(40) = 11.66, p<. 01.
Confidence bias Biases were analyzed to see whether they
differed for unrelated and related word pairs. Average
biases were not different, but there was a significant effect
of trial, F(5, 125) = 8.95, MSE = 52.40, p < .01, η
2 = .263.
The average biases also showed the underconfidence-with-
practice effect, as can be seen in Fig. 6.S i m i l a rt o
Experiment 1, there appeared to be increasing under-
confidence with practice.
Discussion
This experiment again showed that JOIs were poor; in this
case, the correlations were significant but negative. We
found that, as in the previous experiment, JOIs were
significantly correlated with change in JOLs, giving further
support to the hypothesis that change in JOLs has at least
some influence on perceptions of improvement. Change in
JOL was not significantly correlated with improvement,
however, so this is not an ideal source of information for
these judgments. JOIs were found to increase over trials
and correlated significantly with JOLs (the JOI–JOL
correlation was not significantly different from the JOI–
JOL-change correlation, however). It is possible that both
cues might be used to make JOIs: changes in JOL values
and/or cues such as fluency that are related to overall
performance. Using these problematic sources of informa-
tion to make JOIs may be responsible for the negative
correlation between JOIs and improvement. The results of
this experiment are similar to those of Experiment 2,
although more dramatic; it may be that fluency cues were
stronger with these word pair stimuli, as compared with the
n-gram paragraphs in Experiment 2 (since the stimuli were
the only change from Experiment 2 to Experiment 3).
Experiment 4
In this experiment, we compared two different rating scales
(percentage vs. absolute number of words), as well as
different types of JOIs. One might expect that judgments in
terms of number of words learned would be easier and
more successful, due to their simplicity. Judgment types
were either postdictive (after a study trial) or predictive,
occurring before the next study trial—that is, “If you were
to study this list for another minute, how much do you
think you would improve? Answer: I think I would learn
another ___% of the material.” Predictive JOIs may be
more helpful to learners than postdictive JOIs for study
decisions, and if students do make predictive JOIs (and not
postdictive ones). they should have better accuracy for this
kind of judgment. Predictive JOIs may be more likely when
it is determined whether further study would be worthwhile.
Both type of judgment (predictive JOI, postdictive JOI, or
JOL) and type of scale (percentage or number of words)
were manipulated between subjects.
Method
Participants One hundred seventy-one students from the
participant pool at the University of California, Merced,
volunteered to participate for class credit. The number of
participants in each condition was as follows: 32 making
Fig. 6 Mean judgment of learning (JOL) values and recall per trial
(Experiment 3)
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numerical JOIs, 34 making postdictive percentage JOIs, 30
making postdictive numerical JOIs, 23 making percentage
scale JOLs, and 21 making numerical JOLs.
Materials A list of 50 Swahili–English word pairs was
constructed from the Nelson and Dunlosky (1994) norms.
These stimuli have been used in much previous metacog-
nitive research. The list of word pairs was constructed to
include a range of difficulty.
Design and procedure The experiment consisted of six
trials, with each trial consisting of study, judgment, and test
phases. All manipulations were between subjects. The
design was 3 judgment types (predictive JOI, postdictive
JOI, or JOL)×2 scales (absolute number or percentage), so
each participant experienced only one judgment type and
one scale type, for a total of six conditions. For the
prospective JOI conditions, each trial consisted of judg-
ment–study–test (with the exception of the first trial, which
did not include a judgment). Judgments were solicited with
the question, “If you were to study this list for another
minute, how much do you think you would improve?
Answer: I think I would learn another ___[% or words] of
the material.”
For the postdictive JOI conditions, each trial consisted of
study–judgment–test (with the first trial not including a
judgment). These judgments were made after the question,
“Compared to the previous trial, what percent more of the
list will you be able to recall? Answer: I will recall
another ___ % of the list” or “Compared to the previous
trial, how many more words of the list will you be able to
recall? Answer: I will recall another ___ words of the
list.”The JOL conditions consisted of study–judgment–test.
Participants were asked, “What percent of the list will you
be able to recall? Answer: I will recall __ % of the list” or
“How many words of the list will you be able to recall?
Answer: I will recall ___ words of the list.”
Scoring Responses on the test trial were marked as correct
if they matched the target word. No points were deducted
for misspellings. Percentage judgments were converted to
number of words for the purpose of analysis.
Results
Preliminary analyses revealed that some participants were
not successful in learning Swahili–English word pairs. On
this basis, 37 participants were removed from analyses due
to not entering any judgments, responding with the same
judgment on each trial, not learning more than five words
after all six trials, or technical errors. There were totals of
25 participants in the predictive-JOI–percent-judgment
condition, 23 in the predictive-JOI–numerical-judgment
condition, 25 in the postdictive-JOI–percent-rating condi-
tion, and 25 in the postdictive–numerical-rating condition.
Finally, 15 participants gave percentage JOL judgments,
and 20 gave numerical JOL judgments.
Judgments of improvement JOIs were compared with actual
recall improvement, with no significant correlation found
for either judgment type or for either scale type. For
predictive JOIs, neither percentage (average ρ =. 1 1 ,
min = −.89, max = .95, SD = .50) nor numerical (average
ρ = .06, min = −.98, max = 1.0, SD = .52) judgments were
significantly different from zero; for postdictive JOIs,
percentage (average ρ = .05, min = −.89, max = .95,
SD = .51) and numerical (average ρ = .04, min = −.89,
max = .89, SD = .52) judgments were also nonsignificant.
Changes in JOLs are a possible basis of JOIs. In this
experiment, JOIs and JOLs were made between subjects to
avoid influencing participants toward inferring JOIs this
way. A between-subjects repeated measures ANOVA
comparing mean JOIs and mean JOL difference scores by
trial suggests that participants may not have been covertly
making JOLs and using them to infer JOIs, F(1, 125) =
13.30, p < .001, η
2 = .096.
JOI bias Absolute accuracy for JOIs was examined, and no
significant differences in bias were found for judgment type
or scale type, although there was a significant effect of trial,
F(4, 340) = 9.13, MSE = 25.34, p < .001, η
2 = .097.
Percentage judgments were converted into number of
words for the purpose of comparison. There appeared to
be increasing confidence with trial, as illustrated in Figs. 7
and 8, which corroborates the results from the previous
experiments. Average total bias across participants
was −.2872 (min = −7.10, max = 20.0, SD = 4.67.
The low JOI biases may suggest that JOIs were very
close to actual improvement, despite the low correlations.
However, absolute accuracy (Schraw, 2009)o fJ O I s
(average squared deviations between JOIs and improve-
Fig. 7 Average judgments of improvement (JOIs) and improvement
values per trial, by judgment time (Experiment 4)
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absolute accuracy across participants was 45.68
(min = −78.8, max = 897.0, SD = 115.21. No significant
differences in absolute accuracy were found for judgment
time, t(96) = −0.262, p = .091, or for judgment type,
t(96) = −0.45, p = .66.
If we compare these measures with those in Exper-
iment 1, in an exploratory analysis, we find that the bias
was significantly more overconfident in Experiment 1
(MD = −3.72), t(141) = −3.85, p < .01. Also, the absolute
accuracy measures illustrate significantly better accuracy
in Experiment 4 as well (MD = −64.31), t(142) = −2.48,
p =. 0 1 4 .
Judgments of learning JOLs were compared with recall
performance, and significant correlations were found for
both percentage (ρ = .61, min = −.58, max = 1.0,
SD = .56), t(15) = 4.38, p < .001, and number rating (ρ =
.42, min = −.88, max = 1.0, SD = .68), t(18) = 2.67, p <
.015 conditions. There was no significant difference
between the two conditions, t(33) =0.36,p= .72.
Confidence bias JOL bias was assessed by computing the
difference between JOLs and actual recall. For percentage
judgments, the percentage was converted to number of words.
Biases were also analyzed to see whether they differed for
judgment type. There was a trend toward more underconfi-
dence for percentage judgments, F(1, 32) = 3.86, MSE =
111.22, p =. 0 5 8 ,η
2 = .108. There was a significant effect of
trial, F(5, 160) = 61.33, MSE = 44.76, p <. 0 0 1 ,η
2 =. 6 5 7 .
Similar to the preceding experiments, there was increasing
underconfidence with practice, but with a small upturn on the
last trials, as can be seen in Figs. 9 and 10 (percentage scale
judgments) and 10 (numerical scale judgments).
Discussion
In this experiment, we failed to find a significant correlation
between JOIs and actual improvement. The type of scale
(percentage or number of words) did not make a difference
for judgment accuracy (either relative or absolute), nor did
the time of judgment. The predictive JOIs were no more
accurate than the postdictive JOIs, whereas JOLs made
before and after a test have been found to differ (Hacker,
Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000). One possible reason JOL
values differ between pre- and posttest is that there are
more cues on which to base posttest JOLs, as compared
with pretest JOLs (e.g., once the participants have taken the
exam, they know what the actual questions were, how
quickly the answers came to mind, etc.). In contrast, JOIs
do not generally get feedback; JOLs do get feedback over
time, as students are given grades on assignments and
exams (and this feedback may also help savvy students to
learn what cues are more informative). To get feedback on a
JOI, it would be necessary to test oneself before and after a
study session and then calculate how much more informa-
tion was known, as compared with prestudy. Instead,
students will probably rely on subjective feelings, like
increased fluency of information, how answers come to
mind faster, and reduced feelings of anxiety about exams,
but without feedback, students cannot learn whether or not
these feelings are actually informative.
We also found that, in this experiment (which used word
pairs), JOIs were more accurate and less biased than the JOIs
Fig. 9 Mean judgment of learning (JOL) values and recall per trial
(Experiment 4), percentage scale converted to number of words
Fig. 8 Average judgments of improvement (JOIs) and improvement
values per trial, by scale type (Experiment 4)
Fig. 10 Mean (judgment of learning (JOL) values and recall per trial
(Experiment 4), numerical scale
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There are two possible explanations for this difference, since
there were two key differences between the experiments: In
Experiment 1, participants made JOLs and JOIs, whereas in
Experiment 4, they made only one type of judgment, and the
stimuli were different. Making both JOLs and JOIs may have
biased learners (toward overconfidence) and contributed to
reduced accuracy.Alternately, the difference maybedueto the
familiar format oflearning foreignvocabularya wordatatime.
Students might be more accurate in this scenario because of
more experience with this type of study material. Unfortunate-
ly, absolute accuracy measures could not be calculated for the
other two experiments, due to the rating scales employed.
General discussion
In these experiments, we found little or no evidence to
suggest that people can accurately assess their rate of
improvement. People generally thought that they were
improving the most when they were learning the least (on
later trials) and thought that they were improving the least
when they were actually improving the most (on earlier
trials). Experiment 1 showed a small positive correlation
between JOIs and actual improvements in recall, but JOIs
were not significantly different across trials. This means
that it was likely that some people were giving consistent
responses, perhaps due to the rating scale (by this we mean
giving the same JOI on each trial and always raising their
JOL by that amount). This interpretation is supported by the
findings in Experiment 4: Participants in the percentage
rating condition had nonsignificant correlations between
JOIs and improvement, as opposed to the significant
correlation in Experiment 1; unlike in Experiment 1, they
made only JOIs, not JOLs and JOIs. If participants show a
positive correlation only when giving both JOIs and JOLs,
it can be inferred that those giving both JOIs and JOLs are
responding differently. In Experiments 2 and 3 (in which
JOIs and JOLs were given on different scales), we also
found a nonsignificant correlation, and the average JOIs
increased across trials, whereas improvement decreased.
From the point of view of a learner choosing what to study,
the judgment of interest may be a predictive JOI, made before
studying, rather than a postdictive JOI, made after studying.
We found in Experiment 4 that it made no difference whether
JOIs were predictive or postdictive; there was no difference
between the two kinds of judgments in their accuracy.
Perhaps other changes to the question wording could provide
more informative cues, but whether the judgment is a
prediction of future improvement or an assessment of recent
improvement does not seem to be important.
This finding (that JOIs are not indicative of improvement)
is surprising, since it suggest that learners may be unable to
use JOIs as a cue to stop studying a particular item (when
improvement rate drops), or, if learners were to use these
judgments, it might lead to counterproductive study patterns.
Thisfindingsuggeststhatmodelsofstudytimeallocationthat
assume access to the rate of improvement (Metcalfe &
Kornell, 2005; Son & Sethi, 2006) are at risk. The ability
to make accurate JOIs would certainly be valuable in many
instances, especially under time pressure where students
want to ensure that their efforts do not go to waste. At the
very least, it remains a task for future research to document
any situations in which learners can make accurate JOIs. If
learners cannot explicitly give accurate JOIs, it is difficult to
see how they would be used during study to make informed
decisions, and learners may be better off sticking to a
discrepancy reduction approach to their studies.
Some monitoring and control processes may be implicit
(Reder & Schunn, 1996), and perhaps people do have the
ability to modify behavior on the basis of rates of
improvement. If this is so, it is possible that people just
cannot verbally report accurate JOIs. Implicit JOIs would
still have implications for models of study time allocation:
It is assumed that monitoring is explicit, as well as
decisions about what to study and when to stop. This
explicitness allows people to make decisions about their
behavior on the basis of their current goal, and it is not clear
that implicit metacognitive processes could be used to
explicitly guide behavior toward different goals. It would
also be difficult to teach students study strategies if some
processes and decisions are not explicit while others are
explicit. Note that in meta-memory research, it is routine to
ask explicitly for JOLs, and although such judgments do
have some systematic biases, overall, they do reflect degree
of learning (Finn & Metcalfe, 2008;Koriat et al., 2002;
Meeter & Nelson, 2003; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991).
The hypothesis that multiple JOLs are a basis for making
JOIs appeared to have a small degree of merit, since JOIs
were more correlated with changes in JOLs than with actual
improvement (when both judgments were made), although
in terms of absolute accuracy, there were large discrep-
ancies between JOL change values and JOIs. Changes in
JOL were not a reliable cue for improvement, because they
did not accurately reflect changes in recall. In order for JOIs
to be accurate, they would have to rely on cues that were
genuinely informative of improvement.
If the findings in these experiments are truly representative
of learners' abilities, students may be unable to allocate their
study time optimally, persevering when they should move
on, and moving on when they should persist (because of low
JOIs given in the beginning, when the most learning
occurred). Son and Sethi (2006) concluded that a simple
rule of choosing the task with the steepest current learning
curve would be optimal with diminishing returns scenarios,
but even this is not always optimal if the learning curves are
214 Mem Cogn (2011) 39:204–216S-shaped rather than concave; even if students could make
JOIs, this would not guarantee optimal allocation. If students
managed to make good allocation decisions on the basis of
JOLs, without accurate JOIs, learning may be suboptimal
because of ideas about whether or not further gains can be
made on a particular item. Stopping decisions may indeed be
suboptimal, as evidenced by a study by Kornell and Bjork
(2008), who looked at flashcard dropping while studying
English–Swahili translations. Flashcard dropping is a custom
among many students, when they decide to exclude some
cards from further study. Flashcards might be dropped
because an item is already learned or because the item has
no chance (presumably) of being learned. Students who
dropped items had their performance suffer, in comparison
with those who did not follow that strategy. If those items
were truly unlearnable, overall performance would benefit
fromtheir exclusion. This suggests that students were moving
on because their perceptions of improvement rate were
incorrect. Clearly, some students are able to attain high levels
of learning, so we may assume that they have more accurate
JOIs, their threshold for giving up is different, they return to
difficult-to-learn items once they have mastered other
material, or they use strategies to learn those items differently.
It is important to investigate learners’ abilities to assess
their learning and improvement while studying, because
such information will aid in the development of study
strategies and skills training. It may be possible to improve
the calibration of JOIs by directing attention to relevant
cues, such as giving performance feedback or by having
people switch between two lists of items so that there is a
source of comparison. The ability to make accurate JOLs
may be necessary for optimal study time behaviors, and
students who possess this ability will be able to make more
informed, better choices. If judgments are not highly
correlated with actual learning, learners may have difficulty
in knowing what areas need work and when to move on.
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Appendix A
Sample 50 word 4-gram paragraph.
sole legal political party recently there has been
release of growth hormone back into working order
early and late promoters rein on public spending
never seen anything like wanted to know how care in
the community does not make sense next time you go
academic or other problems people who
Sample 50 word 6-gram paragraph.
are determined to bring unemployment down ethi-
poian people's revolutionary dramatic front joint
meetings with our sister society other parliamentary
material as is necessary registered foreign lawyer or a
recognized must be taken into account when scottish
national gallery of modern art car audio specialist
who will top left
Sample 50 word 8-gram paragraph.
optional qualifying subject for the first level certifi-
cate and without risks to health when properly used
while any motor vehicle insured by this policy old
man has appeared in court charged with is a clear
expression of local preference supported already
served five weeks on remand he was cancel this
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